Moral distress is one of the core topics of clinical ethics. Although there is a large and growing empirical literature on the psychological aspects of moral distress, scholars, and empirical investigators of moral distress have recently called for greater conceptual clarity. To meet this recognized need, we provide a philosophical taxonomy of the categories of what we call ethically significant moral distress: the judgment that one is not able, to differing degrees, to act on one’s moral knowledge about what (...) one ought to do. We begin by unpacking the philosophical components of Andrew Jameton’s original formulation from his landmark 1984 work and identify two key respects in which that formulation remains unclear: the origins of moral knowledge and impediments to acting on that moral knowledge. We then selectively review subsequent literature that shows that there is more than one concept of moral distress and that explores the origin of the values implicated in moral distress and impediments to acting on those values. This review sets the stage for identifying the elements of a philosophical taxonomy of ethically significant moral distress. The taxonomy uses these elements to create six categories of ethically significant moral distress: challenges to, threats to, and violations of professional integrity; and challenges to, threats to, and violations of individual integrity. We close with suggestions about how the proposed philosophical taxonomy of ethically significant moral distress sheds light on the concepts of moral residue and crescendo effect of moral distress and how the proposed taxonomy might usefully guide prevention of and future qualitative and quantitative empirical research on ethically significant moral distress. (shrink)

It is suggested that the relationship between visual attention and conscious visual experience can be simplified by distinguishing different aspects of both visual attention and visual experience. A set of principles is first proposed for any possible taxonomy of the processes involved in visual attention. A particular taxonomy is then put forward that describes five such processes, each with a distinct function and characteristic mode of operation. Based on these, three separate kinds—or possibly grades—of conscious visual experience can (...) be distinguished, each associated with a particular combination of attentional processes. (shrink)

It is one of the attractions of Greek syntax that it provides an abundance of usages which require careful discrimination, if we are to appreciate their value; and which at the same time present problems of interpretation which have not been completely solved. This is particularly the case with the use of the negatives, and it is one of these constructions with which we are concerned here.

Edited with New Translation by Richard McKirahan With a New Preface by Malcolm Schofield This book is a revised and expanded version of A.H. Coxon's full critical edition of the extant remains of Parmenides of Elea—the fifth-century B.C. philosopher by many considered "one of the greatest and most astonishing thinkers of all times." Coxon's presentation of the complete ancient evidence for Parmenides and his comprehensive examination of the fragments, unsurpassed to this day, have proven invaluable to our understanding of the (...) Eleatic since the book's first publication in 1986. This edition, edited by Richard McKirahan and with a new preface by Malcolm Schofield, is released on the 100th anniversary of Coxon's birth. This new edition for the first time includes English translations of the testimonia and of any Ancient Greek throughout the book, as well as an English/Greek glossary by Richard McKirahan, and revisions by the late author himself. The text consists of Coxon's collations of the relevant folios of manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus, Proclus and Simplicius and includes all extant fragments, a commentary, the testimonia, a complete list of sources, linguistic parallels from both earlier and later authors, and the fullest critical apparatus that has appeared since Diels’ _Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta _. The collection of testimonia includes the philosophical discussions of Parmenides by Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, most of which had been omitted by Diels. The introduction discusses the history of the text, the language and form of the poem, Parmenides’ use and understanding of the verb ‘to be’, his place in the history of earlier and later philosophy and the biographical tradition. In the commentary Coxon deals in detail with both the language and the subject matter of the poem and pays full attention to Parmenides’ account of the physical world. The appendix relates later Eleatic arguments to those of Parmenides. (shrink)

Magicians use misdirection to prevent you from realizing the methods used to create a magical effect, thereby allowing you to experience an apparently impossible event. Magicians have acquired much knowledge about misdirection, and have suggested several taxonomies of misdirection. These describe many of the fundamental principles in misdirection, focusing on how misdirection is achieved by magicians. In this article we review the strengths and weaknesses of past taxonomies, and argue that a more natural way of making sense of misdirection is (...) to focus on the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms involved. Our psychologically-based taxonomy has three basic categories, corresponding to the types of psychological mechanisms affected: perception, memory, and reasoning. Each of these categories is then divided into subcategories based on the mechanisms that control these effects. This new taxonomy can help organize magicians' knowledge of misdirection in a meaningful way, and facilitate the dialog between magicians and scientists. (shrink)

This book presents the first systematic typological analysis of applicatives across African, American Indian, and East Asian languages. It is also the first to address their functions in discourse, the derivation of their semantic and syntactic properties, and how and why they have changed over time.Applicative constructions are typically described as transitivizing because they allow an intransitive base verb to have a direct object. The term originates from the seventeenth-century missionary grammars of Uto-Aztecan languages. Constructions designated as prepositional, benefactive, (...) and instrumental may refer to the same or similar phenomena. Applicative constructions have been deployed in the development of a range of syntactic theories which have then often been used to explain their functions, usually within the context of Bantu languages. Dr Peterson provides a wealth of cross-linguistic information on discourse-functional, diachronic, and typological aspects of applicative constructions. He documents their unexpected synchronic variety and the diversity of diachronic sources about them. He argues that many standard assumptions about applicatives are unfounded, and provides a clear guide for future language-specific and cross-linguistic research and analysis. (shrink)

On οδ γγελός τίς κτλ. Jebb writes: ‘The sentence begins as if γγελός were to be followed by λθε:but the second alternative, συμπράκτωρ όδοû suggests κατεȋδε [had seen, though he did not speak]: and this, by a kind of zeugma, stands as verb to γγελος also.’ In support he cites only an atrocious zeugma from the MS. text of Hdt. iv. 106; but this has been corrected, as anyone may now see who will examine the text and apparatus of (...) chs. 106 and 107 as presented in Hude's edition. (shrink)

The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between (...) “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes toitself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful. (shrink)

-rupture /ˈrəpCHər/ ; to breach or disturb a harmonious feeling, situation, or relationship From the Latin ruptura, from rumpere 'to break.' The verb dates from the mid 18th century.To rupture is to break from previously established ways of knowing. It is to trouble what is taken for granted, to reimagine the nature and scope of knowledge. When we speak of rupture, we are speaking of epistemological shifts1—reinscribing what knowledge is, how it can be acquired, and the extent to which (...) knowledge pertinent to any given subject informs concepts such as community, morality, politics, and identity. Rupture is a moment, a disruption in an epistemological... (shrink)

Cobet, in his second discussion of γορεύω and its compounds, maintained that these verbs in Attic formed all tenses except present and imperfect from ρ, επον, ερηκα, ερηµα, ρρήθην, save that forms with -αγορευ- were optionally used to distinguish certain alternative meanings. Thus πηγόρευσα etc. could be used in the sense ‘forbid’, but not in that of ‘weary’ or ‘give up’; προηγορευµένα could be used in the sense ‘proclaimed’, but not in that of ‘foretold’ ‘or’ ‘said previously’; προσαγορεσαι etc. could (...) be used in the sense ‘call, name’ but not in that of ‘greet’. These distinctions, he believed, did not break down until about the time of Alexander. Hence his rejection of the aorist καταγορεύσ offered by the MS. tradition in Peace 107. But καταγορεύειν too is a verb with two clearly distinct ranges of meaning: ‘tell, declare’ and ‘denounce, accuse’. (shrink)

In A.J.P. XXXIII., pp. 426–435, Mr. A. C. Pearson attempted to prove that ὅТαѵ ‘not infrequently bears a causal signification … and that in such cases the temporal meaning is more or less evanescent, and sometimes entirely disappears.’ The use of ὅТαѵ where the verb refers to future time is not discussed, the purpose being ‘to establish that the classification which sums up the other occurrences of the construction as necessarily expressing “indefinite frequency” is incomplete; and that a rigorous (...) insistence on its universal applicability has vitiated the interpretation of numerous passages.’ In the question of ‘causal implication’ I am not particularly interested. It is useless to attempt to deny that our English since is a satisfactory translation of ὅТαѵ in many instances, though it is not, perhaps, an easy matter to state what is the exact force of since in such cases. As to ‘causal implication’ I shall merely point out that a cause, strictly speaking, precedes in time that of which it is the cause, whereas a ὅТε-clause properly defines a situation that is of the same time as the principal clause. The question I wish to raise is whether the implication of ‘indefinite frequency’ has disappeared so completely in certain passages as Mr. Pearson thinks it has. Some of his examples are very interesting. It is not easy to see repeated action in them, and we may admit that critics have not ‘seriously pondered the results which flow from their adherence to established convention.’ But has Mr. Pearson seriously pondered the results which flow from his own conclusions?' So far as I can see, he makes no distinction at all between cases of ὅТαѵ with the subjunctive, ‘where no other relation than that of causality appears to exist between the subordinate and principal clauses’ and cases of ‘causal’ ὅТε with the indicative. (shrink)

Though it is held that some models in science have explanatory value, there is no conclusive agreement on what provides them with this value. One common view is that models have explanatory value vis-à-vis some target systems because they are developed using an abstraction process. Though I think this is correct, I believe it is not the whole picture. In this paper, I argue that, in addition to the well-known process of abstraction understood as an omission of features or information, (...) there is also a family of abstraction processes that involve aggregation of features or information and that these processes play an important role in endowing the models they are used to build with explanatory value. After offering a taxonomy of abstraction processes involving aggregation, I show by considering in detail several models drawn from different sciences that the abstraction processes involving aggregation that are used to build these models are responsible for their having explanatory value. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to analyze Lost from the perspective of transmedia storytelling and to propose a taxonomy of transmedia expansion/compression strategies. In the first section, the article presents the basic components of transmedia storytelling from a theoretical point of view that combines narratology and semiotics. After describing the most important components of Lost's transmedia fictional universe in the second section, the article presents a general description and taxonomy of expansion/compression narrative strategies based on traditional rhetorical (...) categories. The article also analyzes “compressed texts” – like recapitulations – and their role inside the expansive strategies. (shrink)

Developing social skills is essential to succeed in social relations. Two important social constructs in middle childhood, prosocial behavior and reactive aggression, are often regarded as separate behaviors with opposing developmental outcomes. However, there is increasing evidence for the co-occurrence of prosociality and aggression, as both might indicate responsivity to the social environment. Here, we tested whether a bi-dimensional taxonomy of prosociality and reactive aggression could predict internalizing and externalizing problems over time. We re-analyzed data of two well-validated experimental (...) tasks for prosociality and reactive aggression in a developmental population sample. Results revealed no associations between prosociality and reactive aggression, confirming the independence of those constructs. Interestingly, although prosociality and reactive aggression independently did not predict problem behavior, the interaction of both was negatively predictive of changes in externalizing problems over time. Specifically, only children who scored low on both prosociality and reactive aggression showed an increase in externalizing problems 1 year later, whereas levels of externalizing problems did not change for children who scored high on both types of behavior. Thus, our results suggest that at an individual level, reactive aggression in middle childhood might not always be maladaptive when combined with prosocial behavior, thereby confirming the importance of studying social competence across multiple dimensions. (shrink)

Presupposing little knowledge of biology, this introductory work focuses on the question of "whether or not biology is a science like the sciences of physics and chemistry." In so doing, it attempts to unify various philosophical issues arising in biology; namely, the relationships among Mendelian, population and molecular genetics, the connection between evidence and conclusion in evolutionary theory, the definitional basis for taxonomy, and the epistemological status of teleology. In support of his claim that "evolutionists have the hypothetico-deductive model (...) as an ideal in some sense," Ruse finds certain fundamental laws in the theory, and he argues for the necessity of covering-law explanations which parallel those of the physical sciences. Further, he sees population genetics as being already "in fact axiomatized" and hence forming the deductive "core" for the entirety of evolutionary biology. Although the author recognizes the complexity of the practical problems which arise in his quest for a "logically rigorous deductive theory," he "can see no good theoretical reasons standing in the way of a deductive evolutionary theory," and he asserts that "the history of evolutionary theory seems to point toward an even greater exemplification of the axiomatic ideal." In short, biology is found to be within the same realm as physics. (shrink)

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence (...) by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence. (shrink)

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence (...) by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence. (shrink)

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence (...) by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence. (shrink)

Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The early Bergman differs from the later Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The laterBergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence (...) by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is modeled on the Wolffian division of logic textbooks into sections on concepts, judgments, and inferences. While it is undeniable that the Transcendental Logic contains elements that are similar to the content of these sections, I believe these similarities are largely incidental to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In this essay, I offer an alternative and, I believe, more plausible account of Wolff’s influence on the structure of the (...) Transcendental Logic, one that puts the focus on his empirical psychology rather than his logic. In particular, I argue that the structure of the Transcendental Logic is deeply indebted to a conception of purity that Wolff introduces in his empirical psychology and that this conception sheds more light on the overall structure of the Transcendental Logic than the accepted view. In section one, I outline two conceptions of purity found in Kant and trace them to similar views in Wolff. In section two, I turn to Kant’s views about logic as they are expressed in the Critique and argue that it is best to interpret Kant’s taxonomy of logic on its own terms rather than reading it through its terminological similarities to aspects of the Wolffian tradition. In section three, I argue that the second of the two conceptions of purity identified in section one is central to the structure of the Transcendental Logic. In doing so, I argue against the widespread view that this section of the Critique is modeled solely on what Kant calls pure general logic as opposed to both pure and applied general logic. I then conclude by briefly reviewing my account and considering some of its broader implications for our understanding of Kant. (shrink)

Aesthetic value is included in virtually all accounts of the values of biodiversity, but this value is still incompletely understood. Here I offer an account of the aesthetics of biodiversity based on the understanding of aesthetics developed by Immanuel Kant. The claim of this analysis is that while individual organisms may be considered beautiful, biodiversity as a whole is sublime. This distinction poses challenges and opportunities for those who manage lands for biodiversity value. Comparison to managing art museums and wine (...) cellars and a new vision for the role of systematics and taxonomy offer some insight into the management of the sublime aspects of biodiversity. (shrink)

Each of our sensory modalities—vision, touch, taste, etc.—works on a slightly different timescale, with differing temporal resolutions and processing lag. This raises the question of how, or indeed whether, these sensory streams are co-ordinated or ‘bound’ into a coherent multisensory experience of the perceptual ‘now’. In this paper I evaluate one account of how temporal binding is achieved: the temporal windows hypothesis, concluding that, in its simplest form, this hypothesis is inadequate to capture a variety of multisensory phenomena. Rather, the (...) evidence suggests the existence of a more complex temporal structure in which multiple overlapping windows support distinct functional mechanisms. To aid in the precise formulation of such views, I propose a taxonomy of temporal window types and their characteristics that in turn suggests promising avenues for future empirical and philosophical research. I conclude by examining some philosophical implications of multi-window models for the metaphysics of perception and perceptual experience more generally. (shrink)

The problems and issues arising from globalization are difficult to resolve, in part because our ways of conceptualizing the conflicts and responding to them are inadequate. This book fills this gap, conceiving of globalization as a consequence of economic, political, technological, scientific, and cultural changes. A. Pablo Iannone provides a taxonomy of globalization processes, investigates the consequences of each, and formulates a comprehensive approach for dealing with them. While his emphasis is philosophical, this is not a single-discipline book. Rather, (...) it belongs at the intersection of philosophy, economics, political science, and technology. Its discussions address issues concerning globalization and correlate the processes of fragmentation and dislocation in a realistic manner. Iannone focuses on concrete and current cases, from the global economic and financial issues posed by the multi-centered nature of contemporary business and technology, through the pressures of ever increasing information overload across the planet. He explores the environmental and social challenges associated with current Amazonian development and its significance to weather patterns on Earth. He considers the issues surrounding the use of robots in war from Pakistan through Mexico, and the militarization of space. In short, the approach, while based on theoretical concerns, is solidly grounded in highly practical applications, which are global in their implications. (shrink)

It is curious how little recognition has been given by the authorities on Greek grammar to the persistent use of the future participle, except within very narrow limits. Goodwin,1 for example, recognizes its use mainly with expressions of motion in the sense of purpose, and in indirect discourse, or with the article, or with ώς: the only quotation he gives which goes beyond these uses is one passage where S0009838800021984_inline1 is found with the nominative of the participle. Gildersleeve2 quotes only (...) cases where it represents in indirect discourse the future indicative and refers to its use with verbs of motion. Monro3 recognizes the use with verbs of motion, and in the following cases, the isolated S0009838800021984_inline2; in S0009838800021984_inline3 in two passages, but with the suggestion4 that the form is not a future at all, but an aorist; in Il. xviii. 309, S0009838800021984_inline4 and in Od. xi. 608, S0009838800021984_inline5. Even then he5 describes the usage in as a use of the future participle, which is hardly to be defended. Kiihner-Gerth6 also give nothing further. (shrink)

It is curious how little recognition has been given by the authorities on Greek grammar to the persistent use of the future participle, except within very narrow limits. Goodwin,1 for example, recognizes its use mainly with expressions of motion in the sense of purpose, and in indirect discourse, or with the article, or with ώς: the only quotation he gives which goes beyond these uses is one passage where S0009838800021984_inline1 is found with the nominative of the participle. Gildersleeve2 quotes only (...) cases where it represents in indirect discourse the future indicative and refers to its use with verbs of motion. Monro3 recognizes the use with verbs of motion, and in the following cases, the isolated S0009838800021984_inline2; in S0009838800021984_inline3 in two passages, but with the suggestion4 that the form is not a future at all, but an aorist; in Il. xviii. 309, S0009838800021984_inline4 and in Od. xi. 608, S0009838800021984_inline5. Even then he5 describes the usage in as a use of the future participle, which is hardly to be defended. Kiihner-Gerth6 also give nothing further. (shrink)

The root *pent-1 has achieved wide distribution in the IE. languages. In the course of its long history considerable modification of meaning has affected it, both as a primary verb and as it appears in derivative nouns, and here I refer particularly to Go. finpan ‘find’ and to Gk. πάτη ‘deceit’. With little ingenuity—against mere ingenuity, of course, the etymologist is bound to be on his guard—it is possible to trace the train of thought that connects the various forms. (...) But though the explanations here offered may well seem obvious, they have not, so far as I am aware, been previously published. The familiar dictionaries of Boisacq, Walde-Hofmann, and Walde-Pokorny do provide attempts at explanation, but these have little power of convincing. (shrink)

Since the time of Brunck there has been a more or less general acquiescence in his substitution of πνθμεθα for πνθομεθα, inasmuch as there is no obvious reason to be alleged in support of the optative. Campbell, it is true, found the optative more in accord with the feeling of the blind and weary Oedipus; but who will listen to this nowadays? Therefore it is the more surprising that Radermacher should retain the optative as expressing the eager wish to attain (...) the goal, basing himself on J. M. Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb, p. 482. For Stahl, who admits the existence of certain exceptional instances to be justified in this sense, expressly excludes from the category this passage as well as El. 57 and 760, and seeks to limit the scope of his pronouncement to the writings of Aristophanes, Xenophon and the Orators—a curious combination. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, personal debt loads have increased dramatically. Lower income earners borrow money to purchase basic goods and services, so their debt is frequently non-discretionary. The impact of non-discretionary personal debt on debtors can be as, if not more, harmful than government regulations that have been declared unconstitutional. In this regard, the impact of personal debt is tantamount to the impact of a civil rights violation. What separates the impact of unconstitutional state action from that of personal (...) debt is the assumption that only the latter are the result of consensual transactions. Consent, however, is not a dyadic phenomenon, it exists in gradations. The quality of consent is weakened when the agent is making choices in response to pressures, and the empiricalquestion of the extent to which a consent transaction is unforced is distinct from the normative question of whether a transaction is legitimate, or fair. It is necessary to devise a new taxonomy of language to clearly distinguish the empirical and normative questions. This elucidates the fact that lower income people are under more pressure to borrow money than are upper income individuals to pay progressive rates of income tax. To argue that the latter are ‘coerced,’ is to admit that the low income individual’s decision to borrow is similarly forced. This admission suggests that a significant portion of citizens of market-based economies (notably Canada and the U.S.) are being forced to endure harms tantamount to civil rights violations. The admission also suggests that free markets harbour forces that undermine individual autonomy, and the absence of corrective state regulation exacerbates the problem. (shrink)

The introduction of transgenic crops into centers of diversity or areas dominated by traditional agriculture threatens genetic diversity as well as indigenous knowledge and culture. It is further argued that the impacts go beyond genetic changes in heterogeneous native crop varieties to embrace effects on evolutionary processes such as gene flow between native crops and wild relatives, and erosion of local knowledge systems such as folk taxonomies and selection of varieties that thrive in marginal environments in which resourcepoor farmers live.

Comments on G. Marcus' criticisms (see record 1996-24670-001) of K. Plunkett's and V. Marcham's (see record 1994-35650-001) connectionist account of the acquisition of the English past tense (verb morphology). The original model is reviewed. Graphing, overregularization, and other criticisms are addressed (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2000 APA, all rights reserved).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:196 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in 1943, was to write an Epilogue to Julian Marias' History o] Philosophy. In early 1944, the Epilogue was conceived as a volume of 400 pages, and later of 700. In 1945 a part of the Epilogue was to be detached and given the title The Origin ol Philosophy. Then one completed part of that was published in 1953 as an essay in a Festschrift (...) for Karl Jaspers. That, and other sections, have been put together here. The first part of the book treats philosophy as a cumulative enterprise in which each man rethinks and thinks further what other men have thought. Even when past thought has reached an end, or taken a direction we will not follow, it is only for the reason that it has already happened that we do not have to do it ourselves. This is not because history is rational but because thought is historical, rooted in ideas we did not ourselves create and based on methods we have acquired and sometimes altered. The second part of the book deals with the origin of philosophy--and the origin of "philosophy" for Ortega is concerned throughout with language and etymology. The word "philosophy" is not one Ortega likes; he prefers the word "aletheia," which was used by Parmenides and his contemporaries. In popular language, aletheia meant discovery, exposure, denudation, revelation. For the thinker, "aletheia" is "truth" as a verb, the activity of uncovering reality, which is concealed under the robes of appearance or falsehood. Philosophy, for Ortega, begins with Parmenides and Heraclitus; "proto-philosophers" he calls them. The Ionians had been scientists; their attempts at natural explanation upset religion and tradition, and prepared the way for philosophy. In a remarkably subtle and complex analysis for so short a space, Ortega argues that skepticism, atheism, wealth, and knowledge of nature created a freedom based on a need to create or choose one's own beliefs in a world in which relative abundance demands choice, since in poverty "an individual is never in the position of being able to choose; for choice assumes that the circle of one's possibilities is notably greater than that of one's needs" (p. 98). The social need to define the thinker and so grant him professional status that might minimize the hostility of the tradition-ridden and reactionary populace, especially in Athens, led to the name "sophist," which became disreputable to a hostile citizenry, and then to "philosopher." Socrates was, unfortunately, the only philosopher, the man who liked, had a taste for, or loved wisdom, but made no pretense that he had any, saying only he sought it. But the name persisted, and helped institutionalize the new profession. I haven't even intimated the delight of Ortega's incidental insights. He was probably justified in believing that his stature as a thinker was much greater than his reputation. A first-rate, full-scale study of Ortega in English would help, but what we need most is a collection and translation of his complete works. RSLPH ROSS ~cripps College Discourse on Thinking. By Martin Heidegger. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 93. $3.50.) This is a translation of a speech and conversation originally published under the thematic title Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1959). Heidegger uses this unusual German word to remind us that there is another way of thinking than the calculative and dialectical modes made prominent by the mathematical sciences and modem cultural philosophy respectively. We have forgotten a less busy mode of thinking, a thinking released from all desire to control reality. Gelassenheit is rendered throughout as "releasement" in this translation. But Gelassenheit does not just mean letting go, or freedom from, as "releasement" may suggest. It also has the more positive sense of composure and a patient letting things be. In the context of Heidegger's attempts to define a mode of thinking not concerned with dominating reality, Gelassenheit comes to mean the freedom to be open to reality. BOOK REVIEWS 197 Heidegger stresses the ability to wait for insight, which is not, however, a mere passive waiting for something fixed. It would be... (shrink)

Philosophers of biology, along with everyone else, generally perceive life to fall into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes, and then pay most of their attention to the latter. ‘Macrobe’ is the word we propose for larger life forms, and we use it as part of an argument for microbial equality. We suggest that taking more notice of microbes – the dominant life form on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary history – will transform some of the philosophy (...) of biology’s standard ideas on ontology, evolution, taxonomy and biodiversity. We set out a number of recent developments in microbiology – including biofilm formation, chemotaxis, quorum sensing and gene transfer – that highlight microbial capacities for cooperation and communication and break down conventional thinking that microbes are solely or primarily single-celled organisms. These insights also bring new perspectives to the levels of selection debate, as well as to discussions of the evolution and nature of multicellularity, and to neo-Darwinian understandings of evolutionary mechanisms. We show how these revisions lead to further complications for microbial classification and the philosophies of systematics and biodiversity. Incorporating microbial insights into the philosophy of biology will challenge many of its assumptions, but also give greater scope and depth to its investigations. (shrink)

We often give culture a narrow definition, confining it to the sum of works of art or of science, and to institutions such as universities, middle schools, primary schools, and museums, and to language, civilized behavior, and the social superstructure. Under the influence of cultural anthropology, we have already come to accept a broader concept of culture, and that is that culture is the sum of the activity of humankind in accordance with a certain intention to transform nature or the (...) things of nature. In this sense, agriculture, dance, physical drills , education, the processes of economic activity, and ancient traditions all would belong to the category of culture. In life, even activities such as eating and sleeping are no longer considered purely natural behavior because they are different from the eating or sleeping of animals; rather, they have been transformed by culture, their shapes and states have been changed. For example, the way in which the Chinese people eat is different from the way that Europeans, or Americans, eat. The emphasis of this new and broader definition of culture is no longer on things; culture is no longer defined in reference to objects such as the products of a museum or a scientific product, but to an activity, such as a dance performance, or some form of cultural heritage in an ancient or a modern society. We can therefore draw a conclusion that the term "culture" is no longer a noun, referring to some kind of substance, but is a verb, and points to a process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Impact of Clinicians on the Diagnostic ManualThomas A. Widiger (bio)Keywordsdiagnosis, classification, DSM, taxonomy, clinical judgmentSurveys of clinicians’ opinions can be very informative. There is a long tradition within medicine that new disorders are discovered within clinical practice. The original edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) diagnostic manual (DSM) was based in large part on clinical experience. The recent editions have been governed more heavily by more (...) systematic research (Widiger and Clark 2000), but many of the new additions are still said to come from clinical practice. As described for the development of DSM-III (APA 1980), “if there is general agreement among clinicians, who would be expected to encounter the condition, that there are a significant number of patients who have it and that its identification is important in their clinical work, it is included in the classification” (Spitzer, Sheehy, and Endicott 1977, 3).Clinicians can also be surveyed with regard to their opinions concerning a proposed revision. The ultimate consumers of a diagnostic manual are practicing clinicians and any effort to develop an official nomenclature should consider the opinions of the persons who must use the classification within their clinical practice (First et al. 2004; Sadler 2005). Clinicians can also be surveyed (or studied) with respect to how the diagnostic manual is being implemented. Much of this research has demonstrated that clinicians might be failing to apply the diagnostic manual in a reliable or valid manner (Garb 2005; Kutchins and Kirk 1997).It is perhaps obvious, however, that a diagnostic manual should not be governed primarily by clinical opinion or current clinical practice. The authors of DSM-III (APA 1980) and DSM-III-R (APA 1987) indicated that they would include a new diagnosis within the official nomenclature if a group of clinicians indicated that it was important to their clinical practice (Spitzer et al. 1977). This liberal threshold led to the decision of the DSM-III-R Task Force to include such diagnoses as paraphiliac rapism, self-defeating personality disorder, and sadistic personality disorder despite the lack of systematic research supporting their validity and the likelihood that these new diagnoses would have harmful social and forensic applications (Widiger 1995). These diagnoses no longer even appear within the appendix of DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000) for proposed diagnoses needing further study.The authors of DSM-III avoided opinion surveys because “no one wanted to repeat the scene of the general membership voting on a presumably ‘scientific’ issue, as was done in 1973 on the [End Page 277] issue of the elimination of homosexuality from the DSM-II classification” (Spitzer, Williams, and Skodol 1980, 152). Matters of construct validity should probably be addressed through systematic research rather than through opinion polls. Decisions should be informed by a fair hearing of the diversity of perspectives, and these viewpoints and perspectives should be systematically and enthusiastically solicited. Nevertheless, the most scientifically valid decision may at times be “politically incorrect.” The authors of the diagnostic manual should have the authority to make innovative decisions that are scientifically justified even when they are contrary to general clinical consensus (Widiger and Clark 2000).Some persons, though, do suggest that the diagnostic manual should be modeled on how disorders are being diagnosed within clinical practice. This is perhaps most readily evident in the proposals of Westen and Shedler (2000) to diagnose mental disorders via prototypal matching. They eschew the provision of specific and explicit criterion sets in favor of simply matching the patient to a global (e.g., paragraph description) of a prototypic case. A purported strength of this approach is that it is said to “conform to the way clinicians think about psychiatric diagnoses” (First and Westen 2007, 473).There are, however, concerns with respect to prototypal matching. First, it is not really clear that clinicians actually provide diagnoses in this manner. There are data to suggest that clinicians instead reach a diagnostic decision on the basis of just one or two individual diagnostic criteria rather than matching to a global prototype (Herkov and Blashfield 1995).More important, it is unclear whether the diagnostic manual should in fact emulate what is occurring within clinical practice. There is a... (shrink)

This paper examines a recent, influential argument for individualism in psychology defended by Jerry Fodor and others, what I call the argument from causal powers. I argue that this argument equivocates on the crucial notion of "causal powers", and that this equivocation constitutes a deep problem for arguments of this type. Relational and individualistic taxonomies are incompatible, and it does not seem in general to be possible to factor the former into the latter. The distinction between powers and properties plays (...) a central role in my argument. (shrink)